How does a household's economic situation vary with the number of children in it? The most recent papers in the cross-national literature on the effects of children on the economic status of households have had either of two preoccupations. One is child poverty, the topic of a recent major conference (Koen Vleminckx and Timothy Smeeding, 2001). The other concerns the impact of children on the earnings (both wages and hours) of mothers (e.g., Susan Harkness and Jane Waldfogel, 1999).
I. Technicalities
The data are from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), a database of household income surveys.' We use data from the nine countries with LIS Wave IV surveys that contain a measure of gross earnings: Australia, 1994; Canada, 1994; Finland, 1995; Germany, 1994 ; the Netherlands, 1994; Norway, 1995; Sweden, 1995; the United Kingdom, 1995; and the United States, 1997.
The income variables we employ are all substantially standardized by LIS. Disposable income is basically what one would suppose: the sum of wage and salary income, selfemployment income, cash property income, pensions (both public and private), and transfer payments of all sorts (including near-cash government transfers and private transfers such as alimony and child support) minus income tax and mandatory employee (or self-employed) payroll taxes. Similar to Gary Burtless (1990) , we have deleted the top 1 percent of the factor income distribution in every country to address top-coding. We have recoded self-employment income and recalculated disposable income to treat reported losses from self-employment as zero. We employ the household rather than the family as the unit of account when the survey gives us the choice (Australia, Canada, and the United States), consistent with the Canberra Group (2001) recommendations. To the extent that the data permit, we call a household a "married couple household" when the household head has a spouse or cohabiting partner present, and a "single head household" otherwise.2 The "number of children" in the household refers only to children under the age of 18.
Although we control for the age of the household head (and spouse if present), we are suspicious of using elderly childless households as part of the standard for comparison even after that adjustment, so we discuss results only for households with working-age heads.3
II. Empirical Strategy
The first step in our empirical strategy is to regress disposable income on age of head (and of spouse if present), age squared, a dummy variable KIDZ for the presence of children under 18, and a variable KIDN giving the number of children in excess of 1 for households containing more than one child.4 Because larger families tend to be older families, we control for age. We have not controlled for anything except age, because our goal is to show how the (ageadjusted) income package is affected by the presence and number of children, mutatis mutandis.
The second step is to run the identical regressions for the following income package components: (i) the head's earnings, (ii) the spouse's earnings (for married-couple households), (iii) the sum of the head and spouse earnings plus household self-employment income, (iv) social transfers net of taxes, and (v) an "other" category that includes both property income and private transfers such as alimony and child support, defined to make the decomposition exhaustive. The coefficients from regressions (iii)-(v) add to the coefficients in the disposable income regression. Since all of these coefficients are measured in local currency, the third step is to normalize them by the median equivalized household income for a household of four in each country (and convert to a percentage).5 
III. Results
The results are shown in Table 1 (for married couple households) and Table 2 (for single head households). The metric for the coefficients in the tables is "percentage of median equivalized household income for a household of four" in each country. Table 1A come packages of couples. In the three Nordic countries, couples with children have higher age-adjusted disposable incomes than those without children. In the North American countries, the effect of the presence of children is small: small and positive in the United States; small and negative in Canada. In the remaining countries (Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Australia), the effect is negative and substantial, on the order of 10-15 percent (of median equivalized income).
The question is whether this pattern reflects the pattern of labor-market effects (earnings and self-employment) or the pattern of fiscal effects (social transfers net of taxes). The cross-national correlations show that the disposable income effects are positively correlated with the earnings effects, but negatively correlated with the fiscal effects.6 The effect of the presence of children on the earnings of spouses is negative in all nine countries; but the four countries in which children have a positive impact on disposable income are the countries in which children have the least negative impact on spouse earnings. Three of those four countries (Norway, Finland, and the United States) have the smallest fiscal effect of children. The three countries with the largest fiscal effects and the smallest labormarket (earnings plus self-employment) effects rank 6th, 7th, and 9th in the effect of children on disposable income. In general, the fiscal effects serve to cushion the impact of negative labor-market effects in countries where those negative effects are largest. Sweden sticks out as an exception, with a strong positive effect of children on disposable income delivered by balancing a small negative labor-market effect with a larger positive fiscal effect. Table 2A , for single household heads, shows that the effect of the presence of children on a single head's earnings is negative everywhere. The effect of children on "other income," which includes alimony and child support, is more important for single-head households than for married-couple households, especially in the Nordic countries and in Canada. Despite some differences in detail, the basic story line is unchanged: countries in which the effect of children on disposable income is least negative are those countries that minimize the effects of children on the labor-market success of parents. Across countries, the fiscal effects are negatively correlated with the effects on disposable income and again serve to cushion the negative labor-market effects where they are largest.
Tables lB and 2B look at the effect of the 6 The values in Tables 1 and 2 Table 1 to that in the lower panel, one discovers that the positive impact of the first child on disposable income is more than offset by the negative impact of the second. No other country "changes sign" in this way. Table 2B , which shows the impacts of the number of children (KIDN) for single-head households, tells a more complicated story. While the impact of the presence of children (Table 2A) The first conclusion suggests the need for further research using cross-nationally comparable data. The second conclusion is evidence that research on cross-national differences in the treatment of mothers in the workplace is relevant to the welfare of children as well as of the mothers themselves. The third conclusion requires further investigation to determine whether it is primarily a matter of behavior responding to policy incentives or of policy responding to behavioral preferences.
